To what extent is the US military ready to meet the challenges of asymmetrical warfare?

Asymmetric warfare is defined by the RAND corporation as “conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities and strategies”.[1] The most prominent examples that the US has been involved in have been the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan. 

Throughout the history of warfare and the United States, there has been a constant to-and-fro between success that the US military has had in symmetrical warfare and the failures suffered when engaging in asymmetric warfare. Successes have been found in key conflicts throughout recent history like the First and Second World Wars and the First Gulf War. These have all been symmetrical wars, where all parties involved have been relatively similarly matched in ability and numerical power. However, when the US has found itself involved in asymmetric wars with adversaries such as the Vietcong, Insurgents in Iraq, and terror organizations in Afghanistan, they have struggled to defeat the enemy. This especially came to be noticed during and following the Vietnam war (1955-1975), where the US advantage in manpower, equipment, and air dominance was outmatched by the guerrilla tactics employed by the North Vietnamese. This essay is going to argue that history is finally beginning to teach the US a lesson in how to combat enemies in an asymmetric conflict. It will argue that the Vietnam war was a good indicator to the US how not to fight an asymmetric conflict whilst the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have allowed the US to develop its Training, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP’s) so as to more effectively counter adversaries in an asymmetric capacity, as demonstrated in the fight against Islamic State and other organizations in the post-Afghanistan/Iraq conflict timeline. It will argue that the developing capabilities in terms of Special Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Intelligence have allowed America to become more flexible in its use of military forces when countering a smaller enemy. 

Finally, the essay will argue that the US is still coming to terms with the tactics required to fight an asymmetric war. The traditional rigidness that accompanies a western military has prevented fighting units from using guerrilla tactics to combat insurgent styles of warfare, rather focussing on using tanks and planes and regular troops to fight an unconventional enemy.[2]

 

The core competency of the United States Military is to fight conventional engagements against near-peer threats such as Russia and China. This is highlighted in the training manuals that are used when training Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines. This has presented a problem when the US has faced an unconventional enemy who creates an asymmetric environment, often where the only troops patrolling streets and conducting visible operations are Americans. The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam were clear examples of how saturating the ground with troops simply increases the number of targets available to the hidden enemy rather than having a meaningful impact on the ground.[3] If the doctrine that the US is fighting under remains the same, it is not likely that they will succeed in a conflict that is asymmetric in nature, especially if the enemy is using guerrilla tactics. 

The state of training within the US military is one that places very little precedent on contemporary asymmetric warfare, focussing mostly on the more ‘traditional’ form of warfare, against a large force. This is show as the US Military Academy, Westpoint, where there are very few modules on Asymmetric warfare, rather focussing on ‘Officership’ and ‘The History of the Military Art’.[4] This has had negative effects in higher military office with senior leaders refusing to adapt to this type of warfare. This has been shown in the war in Afghanistan, where senior officers only designated the conflict a COIN operation in 2008, leaving behind 7 years of mistakes.[5]

This issue is prevalent in regular training too, with regular soldiers being taught how to engage and eliminate a near-peer threat in a traditional engagement, rather than training how to win hearts and minds, conduct strategic operations and counter insurgency operations. These are all tactics that would be required in an asymmetric conflict and is the difference between success and failure as asymmetric conflicts often occur within groups of civilians. 

Following the Vietnam war, the US worked under an assumption that if the military did not prepare to fight against guerrillas in another symmetric war like Vietnam, then they would not be directed to do so.[6] This resulted in a loss of key knowledge learned by the troops who had fought there, thus reducing the advantage the US had in subsequent asymmetric conflicts. As a result, the military returned to training for conventional warfare. These forgotten lessons from Vietnam are only just being relearned and have placed the US at a disadvantage when preparing for asymmetric warfare. The refusal to learn from one’s mistakes is a key downfall of the US militaries training ability. There is a strategic culture of using annihilation as a way of war for the US, and this way of thinking, whilst slowly changing, is still the dominant thought that officers and policy makers have when engaging the US in a conflict, asymmetric or other. Without a strategic shifting of thought over the ideal way to wage a modern, asymmetric and hybrid war, the US will struggle to adapt to an agile enemy. 

It was once said that espionage was not liked very much to the establishment because it simple ‘was not cricket’.[7]This is similar to the notion of the US fighting using guerrilla tactics in an asymmetric conflict. Many senior officers in the US military do not believe that fighting a conflict using specialist, small unit tactics is a ‘clean’ enough or morally righteous way of conducting warfare. This is because the tactics often reflect the enemy they are fighting, as seen with the conflict in Syria, with Peshmerga forces using similar, but less barbaric tactics as Islamic State. Examples include using small units to infiltrate enemy villages and capturing high value targets. Because they are the tactics of the enemy, there is a thought that the tactic is somehow not fit to be used by the great American soldier. A key proponent of this was Dan ‘Bomber’ McNeill, who advocated a far more hands-on approach to fighting in Afghanistan, using sheer numbers and militaristic capability rather than the use of special forces and precision strikes.[8]

Whilst the US cyber/hybrid warfare capability is the most advanced in the world, they have shown a lack of commitment in willingness to use it in an offensive capacity. The Russians and the Chinese have shown absolute wiliness to use these types of measures in offensive capabilities in the past with clear examples of this being Petya, Notpetya, the ongoing cyber-attacks in the Crimea, and cyber-attacks in relation to the 2016 US election.[9] These have been condemned but no retaliation that is known of has occurred by the US. This refusal to use cyber warfare in an offensive capability has given Russia, China and other states such as Iran and North Korea an open table to attack from. A lack of willingness to counterattack shows the US are unwilling to even engage in a conflict of this nature. 

 

However, the past two decades of conflict have placed the United States in a unique position. They entered Afghanistan in 2001, with Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 595 riding on horseback, helping the Northern Alliance defeat the Taliban.[10] It was an incredible example of the United States using the Asymmetric nature of the warfare to their advantage, by using small unit tactics combined with the might of the US Air Force to destroy a far smaller enemy. This initial decision by the US military was a perfect example of how to fight an asymmetric war, and highlights that the US does have the capability to fight in this manner, with small numbers of highly trained troops conducting precision strikes on the enemy. This was highlighted further in the Global War on Terror, when Task Force 714 was created. [11]This force provided a scalpel to the larger US military, with small, specialist teams of special operations troops conducting capture kill missions nightly on high value individuals. This was clearly a success given that in the month of August 2006, TF-714 executed 300 raids and gutted the command structure of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[12] Further experience in Syria and Africa have proved invaluable to the US continued improvement in fighting asymmetric wars. The experience that they have gained in these regions over the last 10 years have proved invaluable when it comes to preparing future doctrine with regards to fighting unconventional enemies in an asymmetric capacity. 

The ability to utilise cutting edge equipment is incredibly useful when fighting a war, whether symmetric or asymmetric. The US has, since the second world war, been the world leader in weapons development, and have slowly understood that if it is used correctly, combined with a good strategy and the all-important human element, it is battlefield game changer when fighting a smaller force. Increases in the amalgamation of technology and troops has placed a key advantage in Americas hands. With small, specialist troops being able to call in drones, access a full combat technology package called ATAK on their phones, they are able to vastly increase the lethality of the individual soldier.[13] This has been the case in Syria, with SF troops able to operate in small teams of 12 men (ODA’s) but have the impact of a battalion of regular soldiers.[14] This is an excellent adaptation of the US military to fighting Asymmetric warfare, as it allows a less visible presence on the ground, with a far increased lethality.[15]

As the world becomes more technologically interlinked, cyber space and the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) sphere will become far more important. The US has been able to harness the power of the National Security Agency (NSA) to help hunt, track and kill individuals who pose a threat to US interests. This is vital when fighting an asymmetric war, when often the enemy is blended into the local populace. With the use of SIGINT, the US is able to track and locate these fighters, thus providing an advantage. This type of technological advantage highlights how prepared the US are for an asymmetric war, as they will be able to locate the enemy faster. This advantage allows a smaller number of troops to be needed and thus reduces chances of collateral damage in conflicts that often hinges on having the local populace on your side. 

As the Global War on Terror has developed, so has the US strategy to fighting a smaller, less technologically developed enemy. This type of asymmetric warfare is quickly becoming the primary type of conflict in the world, with one large power fighting against a smaller, but just as aggressive enemy. The US has changed its initial doctrine of mass invasions of troops, to smaller numbers of highly trained, highly specialised operators, such as the SEAL teams and Green Berets (SF). Money has been pumped into these units to allow them to fully train and understand the concept of guerrilla warfare, allowing them to become subject matter experts in fighting in asymmetric conflicts. This type of ‘thinking soldier’, combined with the technological might of the US military has created a force that is highly efficient in fighting asymmetric wars.[16] The use of SF troops in Iraq and Syria fighting ISIS is testimony to this, with massively successful results coming from the region. These units show the rest of the world that the US is now fully capable of engaging in asymmetric warfare with incredible efficiency. By combing strategic change, equipment development and putting emphasis on smaller, better trained units, the US has created a unique force that is able to engage in symmetric warfare and asymmetric warfare, almost at the same time.  

 

To conclude, it is clear that the US has struggled over the years to alter its main doctrine of warfighting to fit the new type of wars being fought. It has struggled to adapt in a policy setting, with senior politicians and officers neglecting to develop specialist asymmetric fighting forces as it is viewed as a somewhat less ‘admirable’ type of warfare. It has also struggled to change the way that its troops are taught to combat a smaller, often radical enemy, teaching traditional warfighting techniques rather than counter insurgency or counter terrorism tactics. It has been very slow to adapt to the notion that there is a low chance of a symmetric confrontation that turns violent, and that the higher probability is that events such as IEDs in the roads and ambushes in poppy fields will take the most American lives in an asymmetric setting.

However, following almost 20 years of asymmetric conflict, the US has eventually learned how to best counter this type of warfare. The essay argued that the use of special forces troops who are fighting guerrilla style against a guerrilla enemy has proved to be far more effective, with night raids and precision strikes decimating AQI’s ability to launch operations in Iraq for example.[17] The essay has shown that the US has pumped money into Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to help develop a premier small unit fighting force, capable of engaging effectively in asymmetric warfare.[18] These missions cost less money and involve less troops in direct combat, but have had far greater success, as shown in SOCOM’s involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P), which has been successful in reducing Al Qaeda and Islamic States ability to operate inside and out of the region.[19] This was due to the units on the ground being the architects of the strategy and implementation of said strategy.[20]

The United States is ready to meet the challenges of asymmetric warfare, as it has the strategic knowhow, gained from the past two decades, the technical capability that has been developed through experience, and the individual skill of its troops, who are better trained than ever before in counter insurgency techniques, once again gained from the experience of fighting in an asymmetric conflict since 9/11. To be successful in asymmetric warfare, the US must be willing to fully commit to fighting unconventionally, utilising all aspects of its military capability, from cyber, to economic and surveillance capabilities. If it combines its experiences with its military might and smart strategic thinking, its ability to conduct asymmetric warfare would be unparalleled. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Department of Defence, ‘United States Special Operations Command Budget estimate FC 2021’, Available at: https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/SOCOM_OP-5.pdf [Accessed 27 November 2020].

 

Dynamic Software Solutions, ‘DS2 Continues development of ATAK Solution’, Available at: http://www.ds2.com/News/ds2-continues-development-of-atak-solution-development-for-us-military-and-commercial-organizations [Accessed 3 December 2020].

 

Greenberg. A, Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s most Dangerous Hackers, (Random House, 2019)

 

Harding. L, Collusion: How Russia Helped Trump win the White House, (Guardian Faber, 2017), p.150.

 

Homeland Security Digital Library, ‘US Army Special Forces Role in Asymmetric Warfare’, Available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438749 [Accessed 25 November 2020].

 

NSA, ‘Armed Forces Security Agency’, Available at: https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/nsa-60th-timeline/pre-nsa/19510319_PreNSA_Doc_3978470_BlackChamber.pdf[Accessed 1 December 2020].

 

Orr. A, ‘Recasting Afghan Strategy’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 20 (2009), p.111.

 

Politico, ‘ISIS Leader Killed during Daring US Raid in Syria, Trump says’, Available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/27/islamic-statebaghdadi-dead-donald-trump-000300 [Accessed 25 November 2020].

 

RAND, ‘Asymmetric Warfare’, Available at: https://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html [Accessed 24 November 2020].

 

Rynning. S, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect, (Stanford Security Studies 2012), p.137.

 

Schultz. R, ‘US Counterterrorism Operations in Iraq: A Case Study of Task Force 714’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 40 (2017), p.821.

 

Shroder. T, The Hunt for Bin Laden (The Washington Post, 2003), p.52.

 

Stripes, ‘Weapons of War: US Military tries to Adapt to Unconventional Warfare’, Available at: https://www.stripes.com/news/special-reports/vietnam-stories/features/weapons-of-war-us-military-tries-to-adapt-to-unconventional-warfare-1.309688 [Accessed 25 November 2020].

 

United States Military Academy, Westpoint, ‘Red Book Academic Program’, Available at: https://courses.westpoint.edu/static/index.htm [Accessed 25 November 2020].

 

Washington Post, ‘The United States is Preparing for the Wrong War’, Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-united-states-is-preparing-for-the-wrong-war/2018/03/29/0c0553ae-336b-11e8-8bdd-cdb33a5eef83_story.html [Accessed 1 December 2020].

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[1] RAND, ‘Asymmetric Warfare’, Available at: https://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html [Accessed 24 November 2020]. 

[2] Stripes, ‘Weapons of War: US Military tries to Adapt to Unconventional Warfare’, Available at: https://www.stripes.com/news/special-reports/vietnam-stories/features/weapons-of-war-us-military-tries-to-adapt-to-unconventional-warfare-1.309688 [Accessed 25 November 2020]. 

[3] Orr. A, ‘Recasting Afghan Strategy’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 20 (2009), p.111.

[4] United States Military Academy, Westpoint, ‘Red Book Academic Program’, Available at: https://courses.westpoint.edu/static/index.htm [Accessed 25 November 2020].

[5] Rynning. S, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect, (Stanford Security Studies 2012), p.137.

[6] Washington Post, ‘The United States is Preparing for the Wrong War’, Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-united-states-is-preparing-for-the-wrong-war/2018/03/29/0c0553ae-336b-11e8-8bdd-cdb33a5eef83_story.html [Accessed 1 December 2020].

[7] NSA, ‘Armed Forces Security Agency’, Available at: https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/nsa-60th-timeline/pre-nsa/19510319_PreNSA_Doc_3978470_BlackChamber.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2020].

[8] Ibid. p.152.

[9] Harding. L, Collusion: How Russia Helped Trump win the White House, (Guardian Faber, 2017), p.150. 

[10] Shroder. T, The Hunt for Bin Laden (The Washington Post, 2003), p.52. 

[11] Schultz. R, ‘US Counterterrorism Operations in Iraq: A Case Study of Task Force 714’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 40 (2017), p.821. 

[12] Ibid, p.810.

[13] Dynamic Software Solutions, ‘DS2 Continues development of ATAK Solution’, Available at: http://www.ds2.com/News/ds2-continues-development-of-atak-solution-development-for-us-military-and-commercial-organizations [Accessed 3 December 2020].

[14] Homeland Security Digital Library, ‘US Army Special Forces Role in Asymmetric Warfare’, Available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438749 [Accessed 26 November 2020].

[15] Politico, ‘ISIS Leader Killed during Daring US Raid in Syria, Trump says’, Available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/27/islamic-statebaghdadi-dead-donald-trump-000300 [Accessed 25 November 2020].

[16] Homeland Security Digital Library, ‘US Army Special Forces Role in Asymmetric Warfare’, Available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438749 [Accessed 25 November 2020]. 

[17] Schultz. R, ‘US Counterterrorism Operations in Iraq: A Case Study of Task Force 714’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 40 (2017), p.821.

[18] Department of Defence, ‘United States Special Operations Command Budget estimate FC 2021’, Available at: https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/SOCOM_OP-5.pdf [Accessed 27 November 2020].

[19] RAND, ‘The SOF Experience in the Philippines and the Implications for Future Defence Strategy’, Available at: https://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM-6-3/Article/1020239/the-sof-experience-in-the-philippines-and-the-implications-for-future-defense-s/[Accessed 1 December 2020].

[20] Ibid.